Contemporary maritime transport operates under conditions of unprecedented geopolitical volatility. The tragic attacks on civilian merchant vessels occurring in the Strait of Hormuz constitute a stark reminder that the threat to the lives of seafarers is not merely a hypothetical risk, but a real dimension of modern shipping. The escalation of conflicts in key transit chokepoints – from the Persian Gulf, through asymmetric attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, regular military operations in the waters of the Black Sea, to the endemic threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea – has drastically redefined the concept of maritime safety.

At the centre of these geopolitical upheavals, between the commercial interests of carriers seeking to maintain global supply chains and the harsh realities of war, stands the civilian crew of a vessel. It must be emphasized in the strongest terms that this is a fundamental principle of the maritime regime: a seafarer is a civilian employee, and a seafarer’s employment contract does not imply participation in armed conflict.

For this reason, it is essential to thoroughly understand the mechanisms which, in such situations, protect the life, health, and financial interests of crews. The legal situation of officers and seafarers differs depending on the nature of the threat, and their actual rights are shaped by intersecting legal regimes: from the overarching provisions of the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006), through the detailed collective agreements of the ITF and IBF, to national legislation, including the Polish Act on Work at Sea. Knowledge of these regulations constitutes an absolute foundation for effectively securing the interests of seafarers even before a decision is made to enter a risk area.

However, a clear distinction must be drawn between the letter of the law and the harsh realities of contemporary international shipping. When confronted with multimillion-dollar contracts forming part of strained global supply chains, the safety of the crew often becomes a secondary consideration. A shipowner, faced with the dilemma of either breaching obligations toward the employee (by exerting significant pressure on them to waive their rights and remain on board) or exposing themselves to enormous contractual penalties and claims from the charterer for failure to perform the transport, will usually choose the former. From a purely economic perspective, risking a seafarer’s welfare and violating their labour rights is, for a shipping enterprise, simply a much cheaper and more profitable solution.

This situation is further drastically exacerbated by the inequality between the parties. The shipowner holds an incomparably stronger position in relation to the seafarer, who is typically employed by a foreign entity, on a vessel flying a foreign flag (often a flag of convenience – FOC), and is subject to foreign jurisdiction. Any procedures for pursuing claims abroad are extremely complex and involve costs that exceed the financial capacity of an average employee. Being fully aware of this, shipowners often abuse their privileged position, treating potential labour disputes merely as a calculated and relatively low business risk. Consequently, knowledge of the rights to which seafarers are entitled – and the readiness to enforce them decisively already at the voyage planning stage – becomes the only real shield against practices that place profit above human life.

1. Classification of Threats and the Role of ITF/IBF Agreements

From the perspective of maritime labour law, the determination of the level of danger in each maritime area should not be based solely on the subjective assessment of the shipowner. The Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006) does impose on the employer an absolute obligation to ensure a safe working environment, while at the same time indicating that the concept of a “war zone” is defined by national legislation or by the seafarer’s employment contract itself. This means that shipowners who are not covered by global collective agreements have considerable discretion in determining the coordinates of such zones as well as the level of any risk bonuses in individual employment contracts.

To standardize these practices and protect seafarers from arbitrary decisions of employers, a regulatory mechanism has developed in global shipping based on the guidelines of the International Bargaining Forum (IBF) and the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). It should, however, be clearly emphasized that these standards become binding contractual law only when the individual seafarer’s employment contract incorporates a collective bargaining agreement approved by the ITF (the so-called ITF-approved CBA).

For vessels covered by such agreements, the structure of protection is based on three main categories:

• Warlike Operations Area (WOA): Areas of the highest risk of open conflict and armed attacks. Entry into this zone activates the maximum protection package.

• High Risk Area (HRA): Maritime areas where there is an endemic threat of piracy that does not constitute open interstate conflict.

• Extended Risk Zone (ERZ): Buffer areas requiring the implementation of enhanced security measures (e.g., recommendations contained in the BMP5 manual).

This system is characterized by significant dynamism, reacting to ongoing geopolitical developments. According to the latest agreement of the IBF Warlike Operations Area Committee (WOAC) of 5 March 2026 (extended until 23 March 2026), as many as nine such areas have been designated worldwide. The status of Warlike Operations Areas (WOA) has been assigned, among others, to the 12-nautical-mile belt off the coast of Yemen, the southern part of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait), all Ukrainian ports and the northern region of the Black Sea, and more recently also the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Meanwhile, among others, the African Gulf of Guinea is classified as an Extended Risk Zone (ERZ).

Any modification and announcement of a new zone by IBF/ITF obliges a shipowner who is a party to the agreement to incorporate an appropriate amendment into seafarers’ employment documentation, thereby ensuring that the crew has full and up-to-date awareness of their rights.

2. Seafarers’ Rights in the Event of Routing a Vessel into a Risk Area

Now when a decision is made to route a vessel into an area of increased risk, labour law protection mechanisms are activated. The starting point and absolute foundation in this respect is the Maritime Labour Convention. It imposes on flag States and shipowners the obligation to ensure seafarers’ personal safety and health protection. According to the guidelines of the Convention (Guideline B2.5.1), a seafarer who does not consent to the vessel proceeding to a defined war zone acquires an unconditional right to repatriation. Consent to enter such a zone cannot be presumed – it must be expressed consciously and unequivocally.

While the Maritime Labour Convention creates an overarching protective framework, the precise structure and procedures for the enforcement of these rights on vessels covered by IBF/ITF standards are defined by the collective agreements themselves. Pursuant to Article 17.2 of the ITF-IMEC IBF INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2024-2025 (hereinafter: the IBF Agreement), the shipowner has an absolute obligation to inform the seafarer that the vessel is heading to a risk area (or may enter such an area) already at the time of assignment, and if such information arises during the contract period – immediately after receiving the relevant orders.

The instrument of direct protection is the inalienable right of a seafarer to refuse to enter a WOA or HRA zone. Pursuant to Article 17.3 of the IBF Agreement, every crew member has an absolute right to refuse to participate in such a voyage. This mechanism has been strictly secured against potential retaliation.

This issue is further reinforced by Article 21.3(d) of the IBF Agreement, which explicitly states that refusal to comply with an order to sail into a warlike operations area or high-risk area may in no circumstances be treated as a breach of employment duties, insubordination, mutiny, or constitute grounds for disciplinary dismissal. That is the theory. In practice, however, the exercise of this right encounters’ resistance. Shipowners, under time pressure and facing the prospect of multimillion contractual penalties from charterers, often resort to economic and psychological coercion. A seafarer who wishes to exercise the right of refusal frequently encounters informal threats of being placed on a so-called “blacklist”, which in the relatively small maritime industry may effectively mean the end of a career. Moreover, the organization of safe repatriation from areas adjacent to war zones is sometimes deliberately delayed, obstructed, or even sabotaged by employers to break morale and discourage the rest of the crew from leaving the vessel.

Exercising the right of refusal triggers the unconditional obligation of the shipowner to immediately arrange repatriation at the shipowner’s sole expense. Additionally, to secure the financial stability of an employee forced to terminate the contract abruptly, the IBF guidelines guarantee the payment of a lump-sum financial compensation equal to two months’ basic wage (compensation equal to 2 months’ basic wage), which follows directly from Article 19.4 in conjunction with Article 19.3(c) of the IBF Agreement.

However, attention should be drawn to an important operational exception from the shipowner’s perspective, codified in Article 19.5 of the agreement. The claim for termination of employment and payment of the compensation does not arise if the shipowner transfers the seafarer to another vessel belonging to the same owner or shipowner. A necessary condition for the application of this exclusion is the absolute preservation of the same rank and level of remuneration, and the employee must not suffer any loss in earnings or rights during the transfer period itself.

Guarantees under the Polish Act on Work at Sea

As already indicated in publications in 2019, the international principles described above find strict and direct reflection in the Polish legal system. Considering the current dramatic geopolitical crises, it should be emphasized that the foundations of protection contained in the Polish Act of 5 August 2015 on Work at Sea remain unchanged and continue to constitute a guarantee for seafarers.

The Polish legislator, in Article 82(1) of the Act, explicitly prohibits a shipowner from assigning a seafarer to work on a vessel proceeding to a zone of armed conflict without the seafarer’s written consent. Failure to comply with this obligation or preventing the seafarer from disembarking constitutes a serious violation of employee rights and is subject to a strict sanction under Article 114 of the Act in the form of a fine ranging from PLN 1,000 to PLN 30,000.

Pursuant to Article 29(1)(3) of the Act, in the absence of consent, the seafarer’s employment contract is terminated on the date of refusal (or on the date of disembarkation if the decision was made during the voyage). The seafarer then acquires an unconditional right to free repatriation (Article 58(1)(4) of the Act). However, it is worth noting a significant financial difference between the IBF standard and the Polish Act itself. While ITF/IBF agreements guarantee severance pay in the amount of two basic wages, Article 32 of the Polish Act guarantees a benefit in the amount of one month’s remuneration for work (calculated according to the rules applicable to holiday pay equivalents). This clearly illustrates why the incorporation of international collective agreements into employment contracts is so highly beneficial from the seafarer’s perspective.

It should, however, be objectively noted that the provisions of the Polish Act on Work at Sea – although they constitute an example of employee protection – have marginal significance in global maritime commerce. This limitation results directly from the scope of application of the Act: pursuant to Article 1(1)(1), the Act regulates the rights and obligations of the parties to an employment relationship exclusively on seagoing vessels “of Polish nationality”. When confronted with market realities, this results in a drastic limitation of protection, because vessels flying the Polish flag constitute only a fraction of a percent of the global merchant fleet tonnage. Most Polish officers and seafarers work on vessels registered under foreign flags (often so-called flags of convenience – FOC). Consequently, they are subject to the jurisdiction and national laws of foreign flag States, which means that Polish legislation does not apply to them directly.

3. Continuation of the Voyage – Financial Protection, Insurance, and the Consequences of Vessel Hijacking

In a situation where, after analysing the risk, a seafarer gives informed consent to continue the voyage through a Warlike Operations Area (WOA) or High-Risk Area (HRA), their financial and insurance situation changes significantly. However, it is necessary to critically examine to what extent such “informed consent” – often obtained in the privacy of the captain’s cabin, thousands of miles from home and under the threat of losing the contract – is voluntary. The enormous asymmetry of power between a global shipping enterprise and an individual employee means that, in many cases, signing an annex agreeing to enter a war zone is in reality a seafarer’s capitulation under relentless business pressure rather than an expression of genuine free will.

The Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006) establishes overarching safety frameworks, but it does not impose an obligation to pay additional financial compensation solely for being present in a war zone. The Convention does not establish fixed rates for a “war bonus”, leaving such matters to be regulated by the parties to the employment relationship. Similarly, the Polish Act on Work at Sea does not specify monetary allowances for continuing a dangerous voyage, referring in this respect to the provisions of the individual seafarer’s employment contract.

It is precisely within this area of contractual freedom that the previously mentioned collective agreements, such as the ITF-IMEC IBF INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2024–2025, play a crucial role, as for vessels covered by them, they provide for a substantial increase in financial compensation and insurance protection. According to the updated IBF list of March 2026, for each day a vessel spends in a WOA or HRA zone, a seafarer is entitled to so-called danger pay in the amount of 100% of the daily basic wage. To prevent operational abuses consisting of extremely rapid vessel transit along the edges of a risk zone, the regulations introduce a guaranteed minimum payment for 5 days, even if the actual time spent by the vessel in the risk area was significantly shorter.

The situation is somewhat different in the case of Extended Risk Zones (ERZ), such as the areas of the Gulf of Guinea or the Gulf of Oman. According to IBF guidelines, in these regions the payment of the bonus is conditional upon the occurrence of an actual attack on the vessel on the day of transit.

Another element of employee protection resulting from IBF agreements is the geometric increase in compensation liability. Insurance protection in the event of death or permanent disability resulting from an incident in waters of an increased risk zone is subject to mandatory doubling (doubled compensation), which is ultimately secured through policies of P&I Clubs.

It should be emphasized, however, that the above-mentioned protection mechanisms apply exclusively to vessels and shipping companies that are bound by the analysed instruments developed within the system of the International Transport Workers’ Federation. In practice, however, not all entities operating in the shipping sector implement identical or even analogous normative solutions.

Consequently, there exists a significant group of employment relationships in international shipping within which no collective bargaining agreements regulating work in areas exposed to increased risk or war operations are in force. In such cases, individual employment contracts or seafarer contracts often do not provide for any special protective mechanisms or additional compensation guarantees. This leads to a situation in which the scope of employee protection largely depends on the will and policy of a given shipowner or employer.

Vessel Hijacking and Continuity of Employment

Because of dramatic experiences involving pirates and state-sponsored hijackers, key provisions protecting employment relationships in the event of crew captivity have been introduced. It should be noted that this extremely important matter has been regulated at multiple levels.

At the level of international public law, amendments to the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006) adopted in 2018 (in force since December 2020) are of fundamental importance. According to the added Standard A2.1(7), in the event of hijacking resulting from an act of piracy or an armed attack on a vessel, the seafarer’s employment contract remains valid for the entire period of captivity, regardless of its original expiry date. Moreover, the introduced Standard A2.2(7) imposed on shipowners an absolute obligation to continue paying wages and other contractual benefits (including payments to the seafarer’s family) until the crew is released.

At the level of IBF collective agreements, this regulation is further specified and strengthened by Article 17.5. It explicitly provides that in the event of armed hijacking, the employment status does not expire, and full wages and all contractual entitlements must be paid until the moment of safe release and successful repatriation.

These solutions have been fully and strongly reflected in Polish law. Pursuant to Article 31(1a) of the Act on Work at Sea, if a seafarer is detained on a vessel or outside it because of piracy or an armed attack on a vessel, their employment contract is automatically extended until the day the vessel arrives at the nearest port enabling safe repatriation. To further secure the protection system, the Polish legislator introduced in Article 58(3) the principle that in such a situation the seafarer always retains an unconditional right to free repatriation, regardless of when the incident occurred.

4. Public Law Guarantees and the Duty to Ensure Safety

Rights arising from private collective bargaining agreements constitute only one vector determining the legal situation of a crew operating in a dangerous area. Parallel to these, there exist strict public law obligations imposed by the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), from which a shipowner cannot release themselves through any commercial agreements.

Under the overriding Standard A4.3 of the MLC 2006 concerning health protection and accident prevention, the shipowner bears absolute responsibility for ensuring seafarers a safe and hygienic working environment. From a legal standpoint, forcing a seafarer to enter a war zone without their explicit, separate written consent constitutes a serious violation of this standard.

To ensure that potential claims arising from the above risks do not remain merely theoretical, the provisions of the MLC Convention impose an absolute requirement for financial security. Certificates usually issued by P&I Clubs are based on two key pillars:

• Security under Standard A2.5.2: Guarantees direct access to and expedited financial assistance, including full coverage of repatriation costs and payment of outstanding wages (up to four months) in the event of abandonment of the ship and crew. It should be emphasized that if, after a lawful refusal to enter a war zone, the shipowner refuses to finance the seafarer’s return ticket, this situation activates the condition of “abandonment”, entitling the crew to direct claims against the insurer. Unfortunately, the institution of “abandonment” has ceased to be merely a theoretical legal concept. In extreme situations, when a shipowner determines that the costs of delays, insurance, and claims from a protesting crew drastically exceed the freight profit, the vessel together with its crew may be deliberately abandoned. Shifting responsibility to P&I Clubs in such cases becomes a cynical financial calculation in which the safety and dignity of the seafarer are reduced to a line item in a loss balance.

• Security under Standard A4.2.1: Ensures direct payment of contractual compensation in the event of death in service or long-term disability of a seafarer resulting, among other things, from acts of war or pirate attacks. This often also includes financing costly psychological support and treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which may be a direct consequence of service in a war-affected area.

From the perspective of the legal stability of this mechanism during sudden geopolitical crises, the legislator has introduced a strict safeguard. A financial security provider cannot terminate insurance protection unilaterally with immediate effect. As explicitly stated in Standard A2.5.2 paragraph 11 of the MLC Convention: “Financial security shall not cease before the end of its period of validity unless the provider has given prior notification of at least 30 days to the competent authority of the flag State.”

Thanks to this system, a seafarer or their family is not left alone in pursuing claims. The Convention guarantees direct access to financial resources without the need to resolve disputes with the shipowner or wait for an assessment of the shipowner’s financial condition. In the event of crew abandonment or a tragic incident in a risk area, the entity issuing the certificate may be obliged to immediately execute payments and cover repatriation costs.

5. Ship Protection and the Civilian Status of Seafarers

In response to escalating threats, shipowners are now widely contracting Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC). Although the physical presence of armed guards (PCASP – Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel) on board a merchant vessel undoubtedly increases its security level, their employment — as indicated by the International Maritime Organization itself — raises complex legal dilemmas.

The key operational issue is the precise division of roles. According to the guidelines of the International Maritime Organization (IMO MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, section 5.9.1), the Master of the vessel always retains overriding authority and bears ultimate responsibility for the safety of the vessel. However, the Master is not the tactical commander of the armed team during combat. The decision to open fire is based on pre-voyage negotiated Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), which may be enforced exclusively by professional security personnel. As clearly stated in sections 5.13–5.15 of the circular, the role of PMSC is strictly limited to the protection of life against attack, and firearms may be used only as a last resort within the framework of self-defence.

IMO guidelines (section 1.5) also emphasize that the presence of armed guards does not in any way replace procedures from the industry BMP5 manual. First and foremost, the vessel must rely on passive protection measures (so-called hardening, e.g., water cannons, razor wire) and evasive manoeuvres. In the event of an armed attack, the only task of the civilian crew is to seek shelter as quickly as possible.

6. BIMCO Clauses as a Contractual Mechanism for Allocating War Risk

Seafarers’ rights to refuse entry into a war zone or high-risk area arise from labour law and safety regulations, but their practical consequences collide with the charterparty agreement. It is the charterparty that determines how a decision to suspend a voyage affects the allocation of enormous costs. In this context, standard BIMCO clauses are of key importance, especially their revised 2025 versions: CONWARTIME 2025 for time charter and VOYWAR 2025 for voyage charter.

These clauses do not constitute sources of universally binding law but rather lex mercatoria (merchant law). They become binding only once incorporated into a specific contract and represent the most important instrument for managing war risk in shipping.

The starting point in both documents is a very broad definition of War Risks, including acts of war, piracy, terrorism, and malicious damage. Importantly, the activation of these clauses depends on the “reasonable judgment” of the Master or the shipowner. This is not purely discretionary authority, but an assessment based on objective circumstances threatening the vessel or crew.

Both CONWARTIME and VOYWAR grant the Master and the shipowner the right to refuse entry into or continuation of a voyage through a dangerous area. In the case of a time charter, the shipowner may request that the charterer nominate a new safe port. If no instructions are received within 72 hours, the shipowner may discharge the cargo at any safe port at the charterer’s cost and risk. A similar mechanism (72 hours for new instructions) applies in voyage charters, but the mechanisms are more radical: the shipowner may cancel the contract entirely before loading. If a war risk area must be avoided during the voyage, BIMCO 2025 introduced a flexible mechanism for calculating additional freight based on the actual estimated time and costs, ending disputes overcompensation for longer routes.

Under BIMCO clauses, the costs of operating in a risk area are borne by the charterer. This includes reimbursement of additional insurance premiums (War Risk Premiums and Kidnap & Ransom). Most importantly, BIMCO expressly obliges the charterer to reimburse the shipowner for war bonuses and additional wages paid to seafarers under their employment terms (e.g., under ITF/IBF collective agreements).

At first glance, BIMCO clauses appear to provide the shipowner with full protection when suspending a voyage for crew safety reasons. However, this protective barrier was significantly narrowed by the UK Supreme Court in the landmark case Herculito Maritime Ltd v. Gunvor International BV (The Polar).

The Court ruled that if the level of risk in a given area was widely known and factored into the contract at the time it was concluded, the mere existence of a threat is insufficient to rely on the war clause. To lawfully refuse a voyage on commercial grounds, the shipowner must prove a “material increase in risk” compared to the situation on the date the contract was signed.

This judgment, when combined with seafarers’ labour rights, creates a serious and dangerous conflict of norms:

• Labour sphere: Seafarers, facing danger, exercise their inalienable right to refuse the voyage and disembark (under MLC and CBA). The vessel may lose its Safe Manning Certificate and become legally “unseaworthy” under the SOLAS Convention.

• Commercial sphere: The detained vessel does not perform the charter. The charterer sues the shipowner. The shipowner relies on the BIMCO clause, but the court (based on The Polar) finds that the risk did not increase “materially”, meaning the refusal constituted a breach of the contract of carriage.

As a result, the shipowner finds themselves trapped. By respecting strict labour law and protecting seafarers’ lives, they expose themselves to multi-million commercial liabilities unless, in lengthy litigation, they can prove a material change in the nature of hostilities in the area. This conflict is currently one of the greatest challenges in managing war risk in the global shipping industry.

Conclusion

A modern seafarer performing duties in high-risk areas finds themselves at the very centre of a brutal clash between law and economics. On the one hand, they are protected by a broad umbrella of labour law, international collective agreements, and the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, which guarantees — at least on paper — the right to refuse a voyage, free repatriation, and increased compensation. On the other hand, as market realities demonstrate, this protection is often illusory when confronted with the relentless machinery of global trade.

As shown by the analysis of the revised BIMCO 2025 clauses and the judgment in The Polar, the pressure of multi-million charter contracts and the risk of liability for delays mean that shipowners often treat crew safety as just another variable in a cold business calculation. In a situation where forcing a seafarer to accept risk is financially more profitable than suspending a voyage, legal provisions alone become insufficient.

In the face of growing asymmetric threats and the drastic imbalance of power between an individual employee and a global enterprise, the key to survival today is not only the physical protection of the vessel, but above all a high level of legal awareness among seafarers themselves. Only uncompromising enforcement of international standards and the willingness to defend one’s rights — before entering a danger zone — can serve as an effective counterbalance to ruthless market practices and protect what should be most valuable in shipping: human life.

Mateusz Romowicz, attorney-at-law

Ewelina Kułakowska, attorney-at-law