Alongside the development of port and energy infrastructure, ensuring security is becoming increasingly important, particularly in light of the current global situation. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ongoing since February 2022, has demonstrated just how many threats ports, terminals and energy transfer infrastructure may face. Strengthening the capabilities of the relevant authorities must therefore go hand in hand with investment in the operational capacity of maritime services and naval forces. These issues formed the basis of the panel discussion titled "SAFE 2030+ Programme. A Secure Baltic, Secure Ports – A Secure Poland."

The panel on maritime security brought together Alan Aleksandrowicz, Vice-President for Finance and Security at the Port of Gdańsk Authority, Jerzy Kiszczak, Deputy Director for Operations at the Polish Maritime Search and Rescue Service (SAR), Marcin Ryngwelski, President of PGZ Naval Shipyard, Michał Domachowski, Security Director at Naftoport (PERN Group), Tomasz Wawrzyński, Director of the Asset Management Centre at the Port of Gdynia Authority, Maciej Rek, President of Enamor, and Marcin Drgas, Director of the Strategic Clients Insurance Office at Alfa Brokers. The discussion was moderated by Jakub Milszewski, journalist at GospodarkaMorska.pl.

Opening the discussion, Milszewski noted that the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) programme has become one of the most prominent topics in current debates on financing security-related projects. The European Union's €150 billion loan instrument is designed to strengthen the defence industry and enhance the security of Member States. Poland has secured €43.7 billion (more than PLN 180 billion) under the programme to finance a wide range of related investments. Against this backdrop, the moderator asked the panellists how they assess the risks facing maritime infrastructure and whether the current threat level has increased. Representatives of the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia stressed that they closely monitor developments, including the activities of the so-called shadow fleet and the growing presence of unmanned aerial vehicles. They also highlighted the increasing number of threats affecting not only port operations but also the marine environment.

The discussion then turned to risk preparedness, including insurance and risk assessment. Marcin Drgas pointed out that both insurers and businesses operating in the Baltic region have become far more aware of emerging threats.

"The Baltic is no longer considered a low-risk area, although it is not among the highest-risk regions either. Risk assessments now also take hybrid attacks and cyber threats into account. This naturally affects overall risk evaluation. Insurance costs remain acceptable, while new challenges continue to emerge alongside new solutions designed to address them" – he said.

Jerzy Kiszczak added that more than 200,000 cyber-related incidents were reported in Poland during 2025, of which around 800 affected the maritime sector. Importantly, many of these attacks are not carried out directly by criminals but by sophisticated automated software designed to probe security systems, identify vulnerabilities and gain access to critical infrastructure and sensitive data. He described this as "a new dimension of warfare." He also noted NATO's warnings that many groups responsible for acts of sabotage and cyber espionage are financed by hostile states. According to Kiszczak, effective procedures are essential, but so is a measured, calm response rather than panic. He added that agencies responsible for protecting critical infrastructure and combating cyber threats rarely publicise their technical successes, despite achieving them on a regular basis.

Later in the discussion, the panel addressed the security of energy terminals. Michał Domachowski reminded the audience that Poland remains under the Bravo alert level, while cyberspace is covered by the Bravo CRP alert. Both were introduced as preventive measures in response to the geopolitical situation and the war continuing beyond Poland's eastern border.

"Wars do not begin with formal declarations. They begin with coordinated hybrid attacks designed to paralyse critical infrastructure. These can take many forms, from fraudulent electronic delivery notifications to impersonating government institutions or banks. At Naftoport, cybersecurity is handled by a dedicated unit within the security department rather than the IT department. This gives it a broader remit and different competencies" – he explained.

Moderator Jakub Milszewski then asked the panellists about plans to develop a second floating LNG terminal (FSRU 2), questioning whether locating it close to the existing terminal could create additional risks for Poland's energy security. Alternative proposals suggesting another location elsewhere on the Polish coast were also mentioned. Marcin Drgasacknowledged that an attack on one critical facility could have repercussions for neighbouring infrastructure, although the choice of location is itself based on comprehensive risk assessments. He stressed that alongside planning preventive measures, operators must also have well-developed recovery procedures to restore operations as quickly as possible after any incident.

Alan Aleksandrowicz added that all major seaports inevitably combine multiple strategic functions, including energy infrastructure, cargo handling and storage.

"Geography cannot be changed. Ports and terminals are located where geography allows them to be. Once we understand the strengths and weaknesses of each location, we must focus on strengthening its protection through close cooperation between port authorities, government agencies and the relevant security services" – he said.

The discussion then shifted to the impact of the SAFE programme on Polish shipyards, particularly regarding future defence contracts. Marcin Ryngwelski, President of PGZ Naval Shipyard, noted that the shipyard's strategic importance as a naval shipbuilder has grown significantly. Although its proximity to naval bases offers a degree of additional protection, responsibility for securing the shipyard ultimately rests with the company itself.

"Everything changed after 2014 and again after 2022. We have a highly organised security system in place, yet the number of threats continues to grow. The situation evolves almost daily. We cooperate closely with the Port of Gdynia, the Navy and other shipyards, but what we really need is a single, integrated counter-drone defence system, because unmanned aerial vehicles have become one of today's most common threats".

Ryngwelski also highlighted transport infrastructure, arguing that rail access to both the shipyard and the naval port should be restored. At present, logistics depend heavily on Gdynia's elevated road viaduct, and any disruption would have serious consequences not only for the economy but also for national security. He emphasised the strategic importance of the planned Red Road (Droga Czerwona), a view echoed by Tomasz Wawrzyński.

"The Red Road is an absolute necessity. Without it, we will simply grind to a halt. Its construction will inevitably cause some disruption, but it is essential for future growth. Gdynia is already developing an anti-drone system, although it is not intended to physically neutralise drones. That responsibility lies with the security services. Moreover, concentrating maritime infrastructure in one area actually makes it easier to protect, and the presence of the Polish Navy further enhances our sense of security" – Wawrzyński said.

Finally, Maciej Rek pointed out that the SAFE programme is ultimately a financing instrument whose primary beneficiaries are the armed forces and security services. Referring to Enamor's cooperation with Poland's cyber defence component, he underlined the importance of collaboration between public institutions and private industry while stressing that the funding must be used to build lasting capabilities.

"For us, this is a commitment, and time is against us. The funding will eventually come to an end, but the capabilities we build today must remain. A robust cybersecurity system is extremely expensive, and once established it requires continuous development if it is to keep delivering value. We simply cannot afford to lose the expertise and competencies we are building today" – he concluded.